was invidiously compared, recomparingonits own terms" (ibid.,p.689). Ifocus in this article on postcolonial India, where the philosophical and religious secular of Western traditionsbecomes translated into politics as astate policy of secularism. Comparatively speaking,w hereas aW estern postsecularism can entail the rethinking of Christianity,anIndian postsecularism can entail the rethinking of a political formulation. In the latter case,such rethinking can occur fascinatingly in the forum of literary fiction, withits constitutively creative and facile reimagining of the abstractions and violenceofthe political, the historical, and the religious.I read in particular Amitav Ghoshs novel The Shadow Lines (1988) , which containsaseries of charged reflections on Partition and the East Pakistan genocide of 1964.
To begin with postsecularism in the West, American society standsa sa n exception to the secularization thesis,g iven its combination of technological modernity and its largenumber of religious believers.This is perhapsamong the factors that has led some American scholars to reflect upon postsecularism, as demonstrated in recent specialissuesofboundary 2 and American Literature. In the Spring 2013 special issue of boundary 2 on "A ntinomies of the Postsecular," scholars with arange of interests -postcolonialism, queer theory, feministtheory, religion, philosophy -q uestion and critique the presuppositions of postsecularism, such as the kinds of secularism (historical, philosophical, Christian, transcendental, political, among others) that it can assume.I nt he December 2014 speciali ssue of American Literature on "A fter the Postsecular", Peter Covielloand Jared Hickman examine what they term postsecular1,postsecular 2, and postsecular 3. ForC oviello and Hickman, postsecular 1 is "the attempt to examinethe historicalpast unburdened by aparticular fantasy of the inevitable or necessary supersessiono fs omething called religion" (Coviello and Hickman 2014, p. 646) . It is here where Asads challenge to the secularization thesis is particularly relevant. Thee pistemological and methodological "self-interrogation" that results from Coviellos and Hickmans conception of postsecular 1 is what they term postsecularism 2. Thel atter is markedb yt heir question, "what habituated forms of thought, what orthodoxiesm ajor and minor, might get reconfigured from the ground up if imagined away from theira nchoring in an implicitly secularizing framework?" (ibid.,p .6 47). This then leads to postsecularism 3,t he waysi nw hich re-thinking modernity and modern life might occur under acondition other than secularity,inplace of whichthey propose globality. Of the above three senses of the postsecular, postsecularism 2 offers someofthe most interesting overlaps withint he Indian postcolonial context of state secularism. It is here that writers can reconfigure and reimagine some of the orthodoxiesofnation and nationalism, and associated concepts like majoritarianism and minoritarianism. In my book The Postsecular Imagination,Iexamine literature as that site where writers can represent those orthodoxies while they endeavor,experimentally and riskily,toreimagine ethics of belief and coexistence within areligiously and ethnically pluralistic nation-state.Coviello and Hickman developt heir conceptions of the postsecular with reference particularly to the American context and American literature.
Postsecularism and Postcolonialism in India
In this section, Ie xaminet he Indian context of postsecularism, to show the multiple faces of the seculara nd its postings within ag lobal context. Iw ant to begin by showing the differing conceptions of the term "secular" in Western contexts,s ince the Indianc onception of secularism is influenced by the latters Western genealogies.
Theterm "secular" has spatial and temporal dimensions,both with Christian inflections.I ti sd erived from the Latin noun saeculum,w hich, according to the Oxford English Dictionary,can denote "age" or "generation,"and, in Christian Latin, "the world."E ach of these is the age,g eneration, or world to which humanity belongs,inopposition to the timelessnessand world of God. "Secular" also referred to clergymen who livedoutside the monastery,and therefore in the "world." Secular thus can designate the observable here-and-now, the visible world,acategory distinct from religion, given the latters ideas of the transcendental. Secularization in Western societies is the name for the various processes that separated institutionalized religion (for example," the church") from the state,p ushing religion into the private sphere;t he terms oldest meaningi st he states expropriation of church property (Pecora 2006, p. 13) . Secularization can be aspecifically political term, denoting the relation between the political and the religious as amodel for the organization of the state,and its ultimate relation with the nation.A ccording to Vincent Pecora, "the practical link between modernization and secularization remains alive and well, and that the role of science as an antidote to superstition remains as ignificant part of what major Western social institutions -from the academies to the courts of law -considerthe social good" (ibid.,p .1 7). Secularism is the name for the ideologies that emerge alongside or as aresult of secularization, such as the ideology that peopleshould confinetheir beliefs to what they can observe in the material world, or that to have asecular outlook, includingthe beliefthat state and religion should be separate,is to be modern, progressive,and rational. Theword "secularism" was coined by the British theologian GeorgeHolyoake in 1851 to denotethis confining of beliefto the observable and material world.
In India,secularism has aspecific senseasastate policy,and it is including in relationwith this political sense of secularism that writers can imagine postsecular possibilities.A sapostcolonials tate policy,s ecularism has had to do enormous work over and across anation that is highly diverse religiously and ethnically,one in which the state assumes (or sees itself assuming)aprincipled distance from all religious communities.(To say nothingofthe imposition of the idea of "nation" onto India.) Theidea and idealsofstate secularism have deep resonances in India, becoming virtually synonymous with nationalism. This nationalism is important given the role of nationalism in anti-colonials truggles and postcolonialn ationbuilding ambitionsa nd pressures -p rotecting democracy and minority rightssince India attained independencei n1 947 from British rule.T oi ts credit, the policy has been flexible in accommodating various religious and ethnic groups.
Despite the almost intuitivev alue of secularism as an ation-building state policy,e ven termed Nehruvian secularism for independent Indias first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehrus commitment to areligiouslyneutral state,secularism in Indiah as faced several crises.N ot least among these crises is continuing violence,s uch as the massacre of Sikhs in 1984, the destruction of the Babri mosquei n1 992 and the massacre of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, in retaliation againstamob of Muslims burning atrain containing Hindu pilgrims. Among other examples,1985 saw an elderly Muslim woman, Shah Bano, successfully petition the SupremeC ourt for alimony.C onservative Muslim leadersa rgued that the state should not interfere in personal divorce laws established by and for religious communities.P rime Minister RajeevG andhi reversed the Supreme Court decision, amove perceived as not only placating Muslimvoters but also neglecting womens rights.I n1 989, the Mandal Commission recommendedasignificant increase in quotas in governmental jobs and educational institutions for members of scheduled castes and tribes,adecision that remains controversial in India, criticized by upper-caste Hindus.Also in 1989, armed conflictbegan in Kashmir, Indias only Muslim-majority state,w ith insurgentss eeking independence for Kashmir. Where the Indianstate could have used diplomacy,its response in the 1990s was brutal, convertingK ashmir into ac onflictz one under the pretexto f "protecting" secular nationalism.
In postcolonial nation-states, where the combination of religion and nationalism continues to be explosive and often violent, the postsecular does not represent ar eturn to the kindso fr ealisms and imaginaries of religion that fuel violence.S imilarly,t he postsecular is neither ar ejectiono fn or as ubstitute for political secularism. It does not signal ateleological end of secularism. Rather, it is an intimately negotiated term. Postsecularism advocates neither ar eligious, sectarian nation-state nor the uncriticalespousal of religious belief at apersonal level. Even my efforts at clarifying that the postsecular is not ar eturnt ot he religious is at least as ign of the depth of Enlightenment imagination,t hat valorizes secularism as the sole bearer of rational progress. Peter van der Veer has argued that "the very distinction betweenreligious and secular is aproduct of the Enlightenment that was used in orientalism to draw asharp oppositionbetween irrational, religious behavior of the Oriental and rational secularism, which enabledthe westernertorule the Oriental" (Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993, p. 39). Va nder Veers argument is certainly one of many,including Edward Saids foundational work on orientalism, which shows the politicization of the secularreligious divide across the colonizer and colonized, fixing both with immutable values,whether negative or positive.This politicization can result in aformation and opposition such as the "secular West" and the "non-secular non-West,"a distinction Ir evisit at the end of this article.G iven such af ramework, the "postsecular" could be read catachrestically,a saproductive misuse that might connote "return to the religious", but in fact denotes its negotiated relation with the secular.
ForIndian writers,postsecularism can mark the exploration of alternativesto the crises of Indian state secularism while still holding onto the ideals and hardwon victories of that secularism, which include equality,democracy,fair and just legal representation, as well as rights across religious,e thnic, and minority communities.Postsecularism can also mark for these writers acreative search for (re)enchantment, of suffusing daily life with an ethics and vitality that can capture the generative intensities of religious faith and practice.T his search is acutely aware of and resists the violencet ow hich religious ideologies have been, and continue to be,v ulnerable in coloniala nd postcolonial contexts.T his is not to suggestthat apostsecular search or philosophy characterizes religion as awhole by making,for example,anopposition between good religion (characterized as inspiring ethics) and bad religion (characterized as violence). Rather, ap ostsecular search or philosophy in apostcolonial context is similartowhat Coviello and Hickman designate above as postsecularism 1. This postsecularism avoids a fantasy of whatC oviello and Hickman term the "inevitable or necessary supersession" (Coviello and Hickman 2014, p. 646 ) of religion. Postcolonial postsecularism recognizes the enduring strength and reach of non-violent religious ethics( whether from orthodox or unorthodox religious beliefs),b ut is also critically aware of the violence to whichs ome of those ethics (variously appropriated or misused) can be vulnerable.AsIstated at the beginningofthis article,w ithin the domain of literature,w riters can imagine and question "habituated forms of thought (…) orthodoxies major and minor" (ibid., p. 647) concernings ecularism and religion, ap rocess Coviello and Hickmant erm postsecularism 2. Thep ostcolonialism of the postsecular is thus marked by the edge of the political, which includesmemories of colonial violence,tragedies of postcolonial violence,the necessary idealsand protections of ademocraticsecular nation-state,and the compulsions of everydayethical values.
By way of redressing the secular-religious divide,a nd infusing political secularism with someo ft he aspirational and affirmational ethicso fr eligious thought, Indians cholars have offered several re-conceptions of secularism. RajeevBhargava has called for a"spiritualized, humanist" secularism (Bhargava 1995, p. 341) . Rajeswari Sunder Rajan and Anuradha Needham, in their introductiont oThe Crises of Secularism in India,p oint to the existence of indigenous traditions other than state secularism, ones whichcan providefor both apractised toleranceand inspiring ethics:
there [. ..] continue to be significant traditions of populartolerance,rationalism, secular humanism, and attitudes skeptical and ironic about religion,which are not reducible to the forms of elite or cosmopolitan secularism that are routinely attributed to the influence of Nehru and/or ad eracinated modernity:i no ther words,w hat we might call an "indigenous" secularism, as belief and practice. It is fairly common to refer to Buddhism, Kabir, Akbars Din Ilahi, Dara Sikoh, Ram Mohan Roy and BrahmoSamaj(reformist Hinduism), Ambedkar and Periyar in this context:amedleyofnames and influences that are broadly"secular" in spirit (Sunder Rajan and Needham 2007, p. 21) .
Sunder Rajan and Needhamlist examples akin to "non-state secularisms," ones that are largelyhistoricaland which affirm values of tolerance,rationalism, and humanism withouthaving the elitism of state secularism (this elitism meaning that it is imagined by class-, caste-, and gender-privileged policy makers,whose ideas do not have the reach and hold of an "indigenous" secularism). Sunder Rajan and Needham also offercontemporary examplesofanindigenous secularism:
But it is not only the past, and not only the "folk,"who give evidence of such acounterreligious strain. Thew ork of am odernp oet like Arun Kolatkars ignals the profound resonance of askepticism that is marked with compassion and even what we mightcall, paradoxically,faith. But there is much work yet to be done on establishing or forging the connections between this indigenous secularismwhich is part of theintellectual traditions of India and its ways of life,a nd official secularism as political ideology (ibid.,p .2 2).
Although writing in adifferent context,Aditya Nigam, by engaging with the work of Ashis Nandy,captures some of the flexibilityafforded by imagining an "other" space through which to critique as tate system. Nigam has arguedt hat Ashis Nandy must imagine a" non-modern"s pace throughw hich to critique the violence of the nation-state:"He [Ashis Nandy] is concerned with analysis and in that task he finds the imaginary space of the non-modern auseful reference point to highlight the violenceo ft he modern nation-state and its drive towards homogenization" (Nigam 2006, p. 149) . Nigams astute observation of this move by Nandy toward an imaginary space,inthis case that of the non-modern,showsa move similar to the creativeo nes enacted by writers as they reflectu pon the nation-state and nationalism, and their associated violence,r eligious and otherwise.S uch imagination and conceptualization are not purely imaginative, as if disconnected from having to politically and effectively address pragmatic, practical problems.F or example,h ow do imagined solutions address the real problems of inequality,s uffering, poverty,a nd other challenges to the goals of democracy? To invoke two ends of as tate power spectrum, how could the language of the Indian parliament understand and recognize the voice of the destitute,d ispossessed subaltern?W hat will be the time frame until ac onstitutional amendment can acknowledge and answer, fully and justly,s uch disempowerment? In the creative and flexible space of literature,such "amendments" can be placed alongside the originals,thus actingastwo trajectories within asingle representational frame.W ec an consider here SalmanR ushdies The Satanic Verses (1988) . Rushdie interrogates the nature of religious belief and the pressures (and discriminations) of transnational migration by combining two narratives,i ntimately linking the historical prophet Muhammad with Rushdies fictional characterM ahound,t he demonized version of the Indian character SaladinChamcha, who relocates from Mumbai (then Bombay) to London. Such a rethinking of history resulted, of course,incharges of blasphemy,demonstrating at least the stakes at play when imagining an "other" space throughw hich to critique asystem, particularly when religion and politics are involved.
Postsecularism and Indian Literature
AmongI ndian literature,A mitavG hoshs The Shadow Lines (1988) offers opportunities for reflecting upon how aw riterc an attempt to represent the devastating consequences of an historical and political crisis,namely,Partition. I focus on Partition here as it led to the "secularization" of the Indian state,a sa nation-building project. As "secularIndia" then emerged, what were the histories that became necessary for the state to silence and overlook?
The Shadow Lines is set in India after Partition(1947) , and is specifically set in the 1964 East Pakistan genocide,which culminated as revenge against the stealing of the Prophet Muhammads hair from the Hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar, Kashmir. This genocide affected both East Pakistanand India, with religious majoritarianism combining with nationalism, resultinginviolence.InEast Pakistan, Muslims attacked Hindus (some of whom escaped to Calcutta), particularly in Dhaka, and Hindusa ttacked Muslims in Calcutta. Although Ghosh does not set his novel during Partition, two significant historicalinfluences informed his writing of the novel. Thefirst is that Ghoshhimself had witnessedthe riots of 1964. Secondly,the memory of the 1984 anti-Sikh pogromi nI ndia, which Im entioned at the beginning of this article,was still verymuch alive for Ghosh. Both incidentsmark acrisis of Indiansecularism and theconcomitant questions it raises about Indian nationalism. In the wake of Partition, how shouldweunderstand what constitutes secularIndia and what, in turn, constitutes Pakistan?
Ghoshvividly depicts the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1964 in Dhaka. Thenarrators grandmother, Thamma, travels to Dhaka to bring her uncle backtoCalcutta. As their car makes its way through the city,amob begins to form. Tr idibs lover from England, May,i si nt he car with the grandmother, while Tridib and the grandmothersu ncle follow in ar ickshaw.W hen May sees the mob closing in on the rickshaw,s he leaves the car to help Tr idib,t ot he protest of the grandmother. But May is too late:T ridib and the uncle die.I nh er subsequent recounting of the experience to the narrator,May states, (Ghosh 1998, p. 251) .
May has moved from guilt to "sacrifice" and "mystery," the former having religious connotations for her.T his process of understanding is uniquely Mays, and to emphasize the individuality of the search and questioning,G hosh writes this passagefrom Mays perspective, to show she can draw upon the languageof Christianityt ou nderstand the murdero fT ridib,w ho is Hindu. Tr idibsd eath becomes an occasiont hrough which Ghosh stresses national, gender,r eligious, and racial differences,but the register of ethics is translated by him into areligious register. Theevening ends with Mays inviting the narrator to stay the night. She had previously refused such apossibility,sothe narrator now states,"Istayed, and when we lay in eachothers arms quietly,inthe night,Icould tell that she wasglad, and Iw as glad too,a nd grateful,f or the glimpse she had given me of af inal redemptive mystery"(ibid.,p.252). Ghoshagain makes use of religious diction -"redemption"-and situates it within the domain of affect, so that "love" has a certain healingquality,across nation, gender,religion,and race,and perhaps most importantly, at atime of tragic recollection. Redemption in this contextisinspired by areligious context, perhaps inspiredand/or learned by the narrator throughhis intimate contact with Mayand her Christianity.Y et such "redemption" emerges from and addressesthoroughly secular struggle and suffering:the political of the postcolonial,t he politics of violence( and the violence of politics), and not any transcendentalism or escapism.
Suvir Kaul arguesthat the redemptive mystery that May enables the narrator to glimpse is "only partly sexual, and is in fact more her providing him with an emotional vocabulary that has allowed her, and will allow him,tothink of Tr idibs murdera s sacrifice" (Ghosh 1995, p. 277) . Kauls criticism captures the sense that signsstill frame the experience for May,and an ethicalframe is still very much present. Tr ansferring the unspeakability and seeming incomprehensibility of the dilemmatoareligious register -which contains its own notions of "love" (Christs sacrifice,redemption) -gives some perspective and understanding,byproviding both aform (language) and acontent (sacrifice). Theaffective bond that develops between May and the narrator is one in spite of their national, gender,religious, and racial differences,especially in anovel committed to interrogating nationalism and its variousexpressions and consequences (cartography,c ommunalism, Partition, secularism). Love and friendship,p articularly across the real and imagined borders of nation, gender, religion, and race,can then emergehere as postsecularvalues.Shameem Blackhas argued that in Ghoshs fiction "homesand family in apostcolonial environment frequently provide alternatives to the nation and so his domestic spaces and relationshipsi ronically share more with cosmopolitan perceptions,a ctions and ideals than they do with the practices of bounded communities" (Black 2006, p. 46; emphasis original) . As an example of the limitations of what Black identifies as boundedcommunities,Ghosh deploys the rigid nationalism of Thamma in ordertodeplore it, to show that it inheres in the "us versusthem" logic of the 1964 genocides.Thamma is atragic figure,for as she travels to Dhaka, she realizes that there is no literal line on the land demarcating India and Pakistan. Forusreaders,this mightfunction as ametaphor, an instructive metaphor pursued by Ghosht od emonstrate that the corollary "nationalization" of identity has equal, if not greater, devastating consequences as war and civil war.
In keeping with the title of his novel, Ghosh meditates on the natureo f cartography and of naming,a nd on the capacity to speako fa nd represent the violence and trauma of Partition. Looking back over fifteen years,the unnamed narrator of the novel states:"Every word Iwrite about thoseevents of 1964 is the product of as truggle with silence.I ti sas truggle Ia md estined to lose -h ave alreadyl ost -f or even after all these yearsId on ot know where within me,i n which cornerofmyworld, this silence lies" (Ghosh 1998, p. 218) . Thesilenceis ineffable,resistant to representation, and in asense "secular India" relies on such silence as it sanctions official narratives of the secular state and the corollary nation-state,l eading us back to constructions of "secularI ndia." Ghosh offers further reflections on the great difference between the representation of amap and the catastrophes peoplesendure on the ground:
Iwas struck with wonder that therehad really been atime,not so long ago,when people, sensible people,ofgood intention,had thought thatall maps were the same,that there was as peciale nchantment in lines; Ih ad to remind myself that they were not to be blamed for believingt hat there was somethinga dmirable in moving violence to the borders and dealingwith it through science and factories,for that was the pattern of the world. They had drawnt heir borders,b elieving in that pattern, in the enchantment of lines,hoping perhapsthat once they had etched their borders upon the map,the two bits of land would sail away from each other like the shifting tectonic plates of the prehistoric Gondwanaland (ibid.,p.233).
Thet wo bits of land have of coursen ot sailed away from each other,a nd the borders have not remained "etched".I nstead, the lands have been closely intertwined,linked by violence and forced migration, both of which challenge the very stability of any fixed, secular nation-state.Itisfrom this dissatisfaction with and indeed failure of the enchantment of the etched lines that the narrator reimagines thosel ines as the eponymous shadow lines.T hese shadow lines are fluid, unstable,a nd ephemerall ines that are not really "lines",b ut in intimate negotiation with the etched lines.Wecan read them as ametaphor of the relation between the seculara nd its post, with one not existing without the other. State secularism in India was born as an antidote to religious violence,echoing Ghoshs words above:"moving violence to the borders and dealing with it through science and factories". Here we can read "science and factories" as state rationalism, which the state expressesthrough state policies. Thenarrator also suggests above that two nations are two lands,ones that could sail away from one another. This line of thinking is similar to the Tw oNation theory, whichsuggests that different religious groups (namely,H indus and Muslims) require different physical territories,m arked as nations. In the above passage,G hosh also suggests that violence is aphysical object, one that can be moved safely out of sight onto the margins of borders.Wecan induce from this the metaphor of violence and religion as physicalo bjects that state secularism attempts to separate from one another (and, concomitantly,f or the state to "distance" itself,i nh owever principled a fashion, from religion). Yett he shadows of the lines challenge the lines themselves.T hey suggest new possibilities (of belief and belonging) that cannot be etched and fixed, and ones that are not disconnected from the etched lines themselves (hence the postsecular does not emerge or exist ex nihilo of the secular). Ghosh has stated:"writing about families is one way of not writing about the nation (or other restrictively imagined collectivities)" (Ghosh 2002, p. 147; emphasis original) . Theopposition Ifind interesting here is between family and restrictively imaginedcollectivities,suggesting that state secularism can be seen as creatinganimaginatively restrictive collective.This criticism of state secularism resonates with thew ork of Ashis Nandy (1998) , who has argued that such secularism contains an impoverished worldview in contrast to the imaginative conceptions of religious thought and religious traditions,w hich have their own embedded notions of interreligious tolerance.
In her book Limiting Secularism,Priya Kumar argues that Ghosh "undoes the polarizations of Indian and Pakistani by challenging the spatial imaginary of Indian and Pakistani nationalismsa nd their concomitant territorializations of identity" (Kumar 2008, p. 100) . Central to this polarization of national identities is the idea of secularism, defined contrastively.AsKumarargues,"Only by undoing narratives of essentialized differences between a secular India and ar abidly fundamentalist Islamic Pakistan, as the narrator learns,c an we begin to think about possibilities of multireligious coexistence in the subcontinent" (ibid.,p . 105). It is precisely those possibilities of multireligious coexistence that postsecularism can imagine,even as a"non-space" that Ashis Nandy imagines, in and throughw hich critiques of state secularism can exist. In his criticism of The Shadow Lines,T uomas Huttunen argues that "Ghosh highlights imagination as a means of transcending hegemonico fficial representations" (Huttunen 2000, p. 33) . Iagree with Huttunen. Ghosh values the imagination (within his novel, and his novel itself as an act of the imagination) for at least its cognitive value,ingiving peoples recognition of and distance from the hegemonies so deeply embedded in societyand its politicsand representations.
Thep ostcolonial reimagining of the nation, particularly of its hegemonic representations,can serve as an example of Coviellos and Hickmans definition of postsecularism 2,asthe reimagining of orthodoxies from, as it were,the ground up.This is no facile and recreationalimagining:itisdriven by violence, and here again is where the edge of the postcolonial can inform thoughtfulness about secularism.
That sameviolence can also characterize its opposite,peace.T he narrator of The Shadow Lines offers the following reflection:
In fact, from the evidence of the newspapers,itisclear that once the riots had started both governments [India, East Pakistan] did everything they could to put as top to them as quickly as possible.I nt his they were subject to al ogic largert han themselves,f or the madness of ar iot is ap athological inversion,b ut also therefore ar eminder, of that indivisible sanity that bindsp eople to each other independently of their governments. And that prior, independent relationship is the naturalenemy of government, for it is in the logic of states that to exist at all they must claim the monopoly of all relationship betweenpeoples (Ghosh 1998, p. 230 ).
Amongt he distinctions that Ghosh develops above is between people and the state,with people boundedbyan"indivisible sanity" that exists independently of the state.Ghosh also defines that bindingbyturningtoits pathological opposite, violence,t hus indirectly affirming that binding as af orm of peace (a characterization supportedbythe positive valuation of it as "sanity"). Ghoshs description of state effortsatclaiming amonopolyonall relationshipsbetween peoples can be parallel to "state secularism", whichcan be contrasted against what Sunder Rajan and Needhamabove describe as "indigenous secularism". It is in this criticism of state secularism that Ghoshs writing can be seen as postsecular.T his is not to suggest, however, that any criticism of state secularism is postsecular. Instead, as I have mentioned above,Ghosh values non-state relationship as a"binding", and one that contains peace.I ti st hatb inding which suggests ak ind of postsecular affirmation of otherpeople and seeking peaceful coexistence with them ("binding sanity") that offers the positive ethical values of community,belonging, and amity. This is not to suggest that any postsecularaffirmation is final or stable.Rather, Ghoshs reflections on violence and ethics are experimental, representinga search rather than any easy answers or final solutions.For example,the narrator offers the below reflection on fear, in the context of aHindu-Muslim riot:
It is afear that comes of the knowledge that normalcy is utterly contingent, that the spaces that surround one,t he streets that one inhabits,c an become,s uddenly and without warning, as hostile as adesert in aflash flood. It is this that sets apart the thousand million people who inhabit the subcontinent from the rest of the world-not language,not food, not music-it is the specialq uality of loneliness that growso ut of the fear of the war betweenoneself and ones imageinthe mirror (ibid.,p.204).
Thec losing tropeo ft he mirror foreshadows the narrators following image of Calcutta and Dhaka:"[I]n Calcutta, [I] had only to look into the mirror to be in Dhaka;amoment when each city was the invertedimage of the other, locked into an irreversible symmetry by the line that was to set us free -o ur looking-glass border" (ibid.,p .2 33). Thec ontingency of normalcy( whichIwill read also as "peace") is whatm arks any postseculara ffirmative values as themselves contingent, momentary,a nd tenuous.T his knowledge of contingency is postcolonial:i ti sf rom ah istorically postcolonialc ontext,a nd it is skeptical of any certitudes,knowing that power is always present and negotiations with that power (across religions,c ities,a nd nations)a re never perfectly stable or equitable. Anshuman Mondal argues that the image across the border "is not an Other but rather the Self,the divided Indian Self.Itisthis Self acrossthe border that renders secularIndiannationalism afailure since it has not unitedthe Self" (Mondal 2006, p. 28) . Mondal echoes here my argument that violence stands as one of the greatest signs of the failures of Indian secularism (and,b ye xtension, Indian secularnationalism). Where Mondal argues for disunity as asign of failure (and, inversely,f or unitya sasign of success), we can use ap ostsecular critical vocabulary to theorize this notion of failure and success.G hoshs image of the essential sameness across oneself and the other (whether that other belongs to a different religion, ethnicity, or nation,orall four) takes the tentative affirmational risk of humanism. Icall this arisk because,although the narrator knows any such humanism is vulnerable to violence and suffused with fear, Ghosh nonetheless inserts this humanism, however minimally,inthe text.
As ab rief comparison with Ghoshs novel, we can consider Shauna Singh Baldwins novel Whatt he Body Remembers (2000), which depicts the events immediatelyp recedingP artition. Narrated from aS ikh perspective against the more dominantHindu and Muslim responses to Partition,the novel questions the very distinction between "India"a nd "Pakistan". Ih ave arguedt hat if "the nationst hat are Pakistan and India are secular entities,e nacted through a seculardistinction,then What the Body Remembers is postsecular in showingthe crises and injusticesr esulting from such as eparation. Violence in this novel becomes the marker of the inadequacies of the national border" (2014a, p. 120). In his novel Train to Pakistan (1956) ,set in asmall Indianvillage in the immediate aftermath of Partition, Khushwant Singht akes ah umanistic approach in challenging the distinction between "India" and "Pakistan".H eb egins the novel by showing peaceful coexistenceamong Sikhs and Muslims in the village, suggesting that loyalty to ones village is stronger than loyalty to ones religion. As the novel progresses,s ome Sikh men succumbt oa nti-Muslim hate and plan to take the lives of Muslimp assengers on at rain headed to Pakistan. Their plan, however, is foiled by another Sikh man, who is in love with aMuslim woman from the village.Singh thus gestures toward "love" as achallengetonot only religious nationalism but also,paradoxically in the case of India, state secularism.
Theposting of the secular is not only that of philosophical secularism -inthe wake of which posting,therecould be aturn to discourses of spirituality -but also that of political secularism. In apostcolonial nation-state like India, such political secularism has considerable significance,e xtending to minority rights and freedomo fr eligion.T his wide-reaching significancew ill inevitably fall short of adequate recognitions and redresses, and it is here that the domain of literatureincluding the reading Ih ave undertaken in this article of Amitav Ghoshs The Shadow Lines -can imagine possibilities and models of peaceful coexistence and communal harmony.By"postsecular" in postcolonialcontexts,Ido not mean the wholesale abandonmentofthe hard-wonstruggles of the secularism that aspires toward democratic and legal recognitiono fr eligiousd ifference and, again, minority rights.Inthe case of India, such recognition continues to be important for ensuring democracy.Postsecularism is thus aphilosophy or search, which can be enacted through literature.Consequently,Ido not mean to burdenthe literary imagination with great expectations,asifitwere unremoved from the very real forces of history and politics.L iterature is not religion. Literature is not secularism. Of course,l iterature itself is shaped by the forces of secularism and religion, as my above reading of The Shadow Lines demonstrates, and as dramatically and tragically demonstrated by the fatwa against Salman Rushdie.I see the postsecularl iterary imagination as af orum for imagining, exploring, searching for, and experimenting with -inrisky,individualistic, tentative wayssolutions to enduringpolitical, secular,and religious challenges,includingthose of postcolonialism.
In the American literarycontext, John McClure has deployedpostsecularism in focusing on the postmodern fiction of writers such as Thomas Pynchon, Don DeLillo, and Ishmael Reed. ForMcClure,postseculartexts are shapedbyspiritual concerns,bywhich he means that they make room for the magical, the miraculous, and for religious categories (McClure1 995, p. 143). These texts postmodern features -w hich theorists such as Fredric Jamesona nd Jean-FrancoisL yotard have identified, including "assaults on realism"( ibid.), playfulness,a nd experiments with the sublime-can be understood, arguesM cClure,a sr esacralization (ibid.,p .1 44). McClure defines resacralization as "spiritually inflected resistance to conventionally secular constructions of reality" (ibid.,p.143), and as privileging "non-secular practices and constructions of the real" (ibid.,p .1 50).
What emerges in McClurespostsecular analyses is abroad distinction between the secular and the spiritual. This is not to suggest, however,that such spirituality is naïve escapism or other-worldliness. McClure argues:"the spirituality of these and other contemporary texts represents itself,t hen, not as an alternative to worldliness but as al ife-affirming and profoundly worldly alternative to the psychologicallya lienating and ecologically destructive pseudo-worldliness of secular rationality" (ibid.,p .1 57). Such worldliness consists of "compassionate identification with ac reaturely community that suffers,e njoys,a nd endures" (ibid.). It is here where we can find an interesting convergence with postcolonial postsecularism, where such ap ostsecularismi sn ot an abandonment of secular concerns and commitments.Nor can it be aturn, in the postcolonial context,tothe sense of "religion" that provokes violence,the latter particularly attempted to be redressed by as ecular state policy.T he postseculara lso cannot offer the teleologies and certainties that "religion" can postulate because,a gain, postcolonial legacies and conflicts showi ti ss ucht eleology and certainty that can provoke and sustainv iolence.F or the postcolonialw riter, therefore, any postseculara ffirmation is tentative,asearch,arisky exploration, ag esture. There are no facile "answers", and here again is ap arallel with McClures postmodernpostsecular. McClure arguesthat "Pynchon returns us to the domain of sacred experiences and doctrines,then, but not to set us down in somesafe zone of putative certainty" (ibid.,p.153). Thus,while postmodern fiction can decenter grand narratives,i td oes not recentre them, just as Pynchons and DeLillos spiritual searches are marked by quests "to reach and to resist grasping" (ibid.). That resistance showsthe humility of recognizing that one cannot have complete knowledge.For the postcolonial writer, such humility stems from vulnerability:to power, to coloniall egacies,t op resent inequities and to the easily manifest realities of violence.
McClure invokesp ostcolonial theorists Homi Bhabhaa nd Ashis Nandy to argue for rethinking postmodernism as constituted by "voices [that] challenge the hegemony of secular rationalist discourse" (ibid.,p .1 48), and thus expand the range of postmodern texts to include works fromL atin American, African American, and Native American writers.T he intersection herew ith postcolonialism is through the route of power, in recognizing that postcolonial theorists can offer insights intopractices of institutional and epistemological exclusion and marginalization. One possible connotation (and Ia mn ot attributing this to McClure) of such an expanded definition of postmodern texts is the equation of the non-West with "religion" or "non-secularism". Since the 1995 publication of McClures article,the world has of course become adifferent place,not the least because of the rise of social media and of international religious violence driven by terrorism,provoking rethinking of the distinction between the "secular West" and the "non-secular non-West". By turning to diasporic postcolonial writers with influences from both,say,India and the US -asinthe case of Amitav Ghosh and SalmanRushdie -wecan examine how theremight be at least adoubleposting of the secular, of both philosophical secularism and postcolonial state secularism. Thep ostsecularism that such writers reach and gesture toward,e xplore,a nd imagineisone that might decenter some of the most sacredideas and practices of majoritarianism, minoritarianism, multiculturalism, nationalism,f aith, and religion, among others.
